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ARGUMENT
A.

CBI IS NOT A REAL PROPERTY CONTRACTOR

The Audit Division asserts that CBI is a real property
contractor, and, therefore, is liable for sales tax on its
purchases of materials.

(Respondent's brief at page 11.)

However, the uncontroverted evidence presented at the hearing
showed that CBI's only activities at its Salt Lake facility, and
the only activities which the Audit Division seeks to tax, or has
the power to tax, consisted exclusively of manufacturing.

The

uncontroverted facts are:
1.

CBI is a manufacturer of large all-welded steel

plate water storage tanks, petroleum and chemical storage tanks,
low-temperature pressure vessels for liquefied gases, waste water
treatment equipment, pulp and woodyard equipment, and other large
metal structures primarily for storing, processing, mixing or
blending of materials.
2.

(Transcript at pages 21-29.)

The Salt Lake facility was built exclusively for

manufacturing steel plate into such tanks, spherical pressure
vessels, containers, and other products.

(Transcript at pages

16-17.)
3.

The equipment housed at the Salt Lake facility was

designed and used exclusively for manufacturing steel plate into
such tanks, spherical pressure vessels, storage containers, and
other products.
gi\wpc\082\00000173p.w51

(Transcript at page 17.)
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4.

Neither the Salt Lake facility and the equipment

located in it, nor the personnel at the Salt Lake facility, were
ever used to affix to real property CBI's manufactured tanks,
either within Utah or outside of Utah.

(Transcript at pages 30-

31, 37, 46-47.)
5.

The functions performed at the Salt Lake facility,

and the only activities of CBI which the Audit division seeks to
tax, consisted solely of manufacturing large steel plate water
storage tanks, petroleum and chemical storage tanks, lowtemperature pressure vessels for liquefied gases, waste water
treatment equipment, pulp and woodyard equipment, and other large
metal structures, and, during the period in question, decking for
the Golden Gate Bridge.
6.

(Transcript at pages 21-22.)

But for the practical constraints of transporting

such large tanks and other CBI products, CBI would have assembled
and shipped them in completed form to their final destinations.
(Transcript at pages 10, 23-24, 40.)
7.

On occasion, tanks and other CBI products that

have been assembled at a customer's site are later disassembled,
transported to another location, and reassembled, although never
by CBI personnel from the Salt Lake facility.

(Transcript at

page 45.)
The Audit Division presented no evidence at the hearing
that CBI's activities at its Salt Lake facility consisted of
gt\wpc\082\00000173p.w51
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anything but manufacturing tanks, spherical pressure vessels,
containers, and other personal property.
The order of the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Tax
Commission") ignores the plain evidence of the nature of CBI's
business activity - CBI manufactures very large items of personal
property.

With respect to the tanks, pressure vessels and other

containers, they have a top, a bottom and sides.

The fact that

these very large items of personal property are generally
assembled at the customer's site does not change their nature or
function, nor does it change the nature of the manufacturing
activities that took place in Utah.

CBI does not build houses,

or offices, or buildings of any sort whatsoever.
The Audit Division cites a Michigan appellate court
case, Miedema Metal Building Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Treasury,
338 N.W.2d 924 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), and a California district
court case, Levine v. State Bd. of Equalization, 299 P.2d 738
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956), to support its assertion that CBI is
a real property contractor.

Neither case is on point.

The Miedema case involved intrastate taxation of a
company which sold and constructed grain storage bins entirely
within the State of Michigan.

The taxpayer did not manufacture

the grain storage bins it sold; it merely sold and erected them.
The issue in the case was not whether the taxpayer was a real
property contractor; and there was no finding that the taxpayer
gi\wpc\082\00000173p.ir51

3

was a real property contractor.

Nor was the issue whether the

storage bins constituted real or personal property.

In fact, for

purposes of the statute at issue, the court presumed that the
grain bins were, in fact, personal property.
The issue in the case was whether the bins were exempt
from Michigan sales and use taxes under a Michigan statute that
provided a complete exemption for personal property that
comprised part of an agricultural processing system.

In holding

that the sale of the bins should not escape taxation, the
Michigan court relied exclusively on the language of the statute
itself.

The statute specifically denied the exemption to

"tangible personal property 'permanently affixed and becoming a
structural part of real estate'."

338 N.W. 2d 926.

Finding that

the personal property was "permanently affixed" to real estate,
the court denied the exemption.
Reference to the California district court case, Levine
v. State Board of Equalization. is also wholly unproductive.

The

Levine case is a decision of a California district court on facts
completely unrelated to the facts at issue in this case. More
important, there is no need to consult a California district
court case on unrelated facts where the California Supreme Court
has already specifically held that based upon the very facts at
issue in this case, CBI is a manufacturer.

According to the

California Supreme Court, "Plaintiff, Chicago Bridge & Iron, is
Si\vpc\082\00000173p.w51
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primarily a manufacturer of tanks."

Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v.

Johnson, 19 Cal.2d 162, 163, 119, P.2d 945, 946 (1941).
CBI's Brief of Appellant at pages 12-14.

See

CBI's business has not

changed since 1941.
The Audit Division's assertion that CBI is a real
property contractor depends entirely upon the extraterritorial
event of assembly of its products.

However, the Audit Division

concedes that CBI cannot be taxed on sales of tanks or other
personal property where the passage of title and delivery occurs
outside of Utah.1

(Transcript at page 69.)

There is simply no

basis under the law for using events that take place after the
purchase of raw materials upon which CBI is required by
California law to self-assess use tax, and which events take
place outside Utah, to justify the taxation by Utah of the
purchase of the raw materials.

Notwithstanding
what
is
clearly
extraterritorial,
unconstitutional taxation, the Audit Division's assessed deficiency
includes tax on sales of personal property by CBI to California
customers where the terms of such sales are "F.O.B. destination".
The Audit Division has refused to reduce the assessed deficiency of
CBI for such "F.O.B." sales. This is clearly contrary to the Tax
Commission's order. (Record at page 57.) It is unquestioned that
the Utah Tax Commission may not impose a sales tax on the sale of
tangible personal property by a seller located within Utah to a
purchaser located outside Utah when the delivery—the taxable
event—occurs outside Utah. EVCO v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91 (1972) (per
curium); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938). As a
matter of law, any F.O.B. sales included in the assessed deficiency
and taxed by the Audit Division must be refunded.
gi\wpc\Q82\00000173p.tr51
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As conceded by the Audit Division at the hearing, if
CBI is a manufacturer, its purchases of steel plate and other raw
materials are exempt from Utah sales and use taxes.
at p. 62.)

(Transcript

The uncontroverted evidence presented at the hearing

and case law that specifically analyzes CBI and its business
activities establish that CBI is a manufacturer of personal
property, not a real property contractor.

As a manufacturer of

personal property, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-4(g), CBI
was exempt from Utah sales and use taxes on purchases of steel
plate and other raw materials that became component parts of the
tanks it manufactured at the Salt Lake facility.
B.

CBI'S PURCHASES OF STEEL PLATE AND OTHER RAW
MATERIALS ARE EXEMPT UNDER UTAH CODE ANN.
S 59-16-4(g)

The Audit Division argues that CBI failed to show at
the hearing that it was a "manufacturer" within the meaning of
Utah Code Ann. S 59-16-4(g).
could hardly be more wrong.

The Audit Division's assertion
The only evidence presented at the

hearing was that CBI was a manufacturer; the Audit Division did
not present a single piece of evidence to the contrary.
On direct examination, Mr. Leonard Christofferson, the
plant manager of the Salt Lake facility during the period in
question, testified as followsi
[Question.] All right. Now, given the facility
that you've described and the equipment that at least
in part you have described at the facility, let's
gi\wpc\082\00000173p.v51
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discuss, if you can, a typical job that you did during
this time. Let's—let's set aside for a minute the
Golden Gate job; but describe for me at the facility
how, generally, your operation out there would
undertake and perform a job, and what did you do? Just
tell us what you did.
[Answer.] Okay. If we were—if the job happened
to be, for example, a very plain, basic steel water
tank, for example, we—we've all seen tanks around
refineries, just the big vertical shell, cylindrical
shells on it, we would bring those plates in
individually and oxe-acetelyne burning—burn them to be
a perfectly rectangular shape, and by that, I mean
within tolerances, it would probably be within a 32nd
of an inch of true dimension. And size all of the
plates that go into the tank wall, and then we would
pass them through a roll-forming operation to put the
correct curvature in the plates. And that would be the
total manufacturing of those components.
Now, the tank bottom would be a—a question of
moving the plates in and oxe-acetelyne burning the
plates in a—in a kind of like a jigsaw puzzle, so that
when you put it all together you have a large circle
for the tank bottom, and so they would all be laid out
with patterns and so forth, and again, oxe-acetelyne
burning them, and assuming they don't paint—I'm making
this relatively brief.
For the roof of the tank, you would typically
fabricate some structural steel members, such as
channels that would be put up like rafters on a home,
for example, the radial in the tank, supported by
columns and then so that would involve cutting the
rafters, drilling holes to bolt it to the—to the wall
of the tank and bolt it up in the center, and also
cutting a lot of little small pieces for gusset plates
to bolt to support all this framing, and then you would
perform the operations for roof plates the same as the
bottom. It would be something that when put together,
assembled at the site, would make up a big circle and
set on top of it.•
(Transcript at pages 21-22.)

gi\wpc\082\00000173p.w51
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[Question,] What kind of products did you make
out there, other than tanks?
[Answer.] Well, during the time period in
question, we—we fabricated some spherical pressure
vessels, and these were quite large, I don't remember
the exact dimensions, but they would be in the vicinity
of 50 feet in diameter fully—fully assembled. We
manufactured all of the roadway deck components for the
Golden Gate Bridge rehabilitation project. We
manufactured components for a wind tunnel at Langly
Field, Virginia. We manufactured what is known as a
ying-yang, which is a very large, very massive piece of
stainless steel. It's—it's actually a magnet case
that was erected at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratories
in California for fusion-type research. Now, I—I
don't know exactly how they use it for all of that, but
it was a very unique—unique item and we typically did
in addition to our tank work, our tank and pressure
vessel work was always a common product line for years,
but in addition, we nearly always had some of these
unique jobs, one-of-a-kind type jobs in our plant at
the same time, such as the bridge, the ying-yang, the
wind tunnel, you don't repeat these jobs very often,
maybe once every ten or 15 years, but somehow, there's
always some around and we always seem to have some.
I think the period of question, those are probably
the significant jobs we did.
(Transcript at page 24.)
(Mr. Christofferson then illustrated with photographs
each of the types of items manufactured at the Salt Lake
facility.

Those photographs and a video tape about the Golden

Gate Bridge project are in Envelopes A and B attached to the
Record.)

[Question.] And from an engineering and
manufacturing standpoint, is there any difference
between manufacturing a large pressure vessel, for
gs\wpc\082\00000173p.v51
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instance, or a hot water tank that you're going to put
in somebody's house?
[Answer.] Okay. A hot water tank in a house is
actually a pressure vessel because it—it—it stores
water under whatever line pressure your house has, and
if you open a valve on top, it'll shoot it up, so it's
not atmospheric storage. It is in fact a pressure
vessel. But the only real difference between that
pressure vessel and a large propane pressure vessel
that, say, is 50 feet in diameter, is the equipment
that it takes to build it. It takes larger, heavier
equipment and—but the basic designs are really not any
different. Pressure is pressure, and it's retained by
certain—there's certain engineering principles for
designing pressure retaining parts, and whether they're
small or large, the principles don't change, but the
complexity of actually doing the work does change,
because the large ones are made up of many, many pieces
that have to be accurately manufactured, they have to
fit very perfectly, to make up these large sections,
there's very little room for error, and the steel gets
thicker and thicker, the larger in diameter it gets, it
becomes very thick, might be an inch-and-a-half or two
inches thick or something like that. And—and so, it's
really basically, the bigger they get, the tougher they
get to build, but the real principles of what has to
happen don't change.
(Transcript at page 28.)

[Question.] Now, does your facility and your
group here have any role in the con—in the direction
and assembly that's done in another state?
[Answer.]

None whatsoever.

(Transcript at pages 30-31.)

[Question.] Now, have there ever been instances
in which, let's say, a tank has been sent to a site,
assembled and erected, and then later torn down and
shipped to someplace else?
gt\wpc\082\00000173p.w51
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[Answer.] Oh, yeah, there's been tanks erected at
sites and then torn down and shipped to other places.
We—we in the manufacturing had nothing to do with them
when they were, we didn't do anything with them.
[Question.]

But it does happen?

[Answer.] It occasionally happens, that someone
will want a tank moved and someone will go move it.
It's not very common, but i t — I — i n all honesty, it has
happened, so the answer is really yes.
(Transcript at page 45.)
On examination by Commissioner Hansen, Mr. Christofferson further
testified:
COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Now, you indicated, I
believe at one time a comment was made that
transportation limitations is the only reason that
components were not assembled at the plant. Picturing
what I call a small tank, 12 feet diameter, 12 feet
high, would that be assembled at the plant here in Salt
Lake?
THE WITNESS: It would depend on the shipping
destination. I would say that 12 feet, you may be able
to ship it to quite a number of places, perhaps not
everywhere, but depending on where it needed to go.
COMMISSIONER HANSEN:

But if you could, you would?

THE WITNESS: Sure. If you could, you'd
manufacture the entire tank, you would.
(Transcript at page 40.)
The Audit Division presented no evidence to rebut the
evidence presented by CBI at the hearing that the only activities
of CBI at its Salt Lake facility were manufacturing items of
personal property, including tanks, pressure vessels and other
items of personal property.
gi\wpc\082\00000173p.w51
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to the customer's place of business and assembling the tanks for
the customer were necessary activities in selling very large
tanks.

The Audit Division mistakenly believes the inverse to be

true—manufacturing tanks is incidental to transporting and
assembling tanks.
C.

THE AUDIT DIVISION'S POSITION WILL SUBJECT CBI TO
DOUBLE TAXATION

The Audit Division alleges that its position will not
subject CBI to double taxation and is not internally
inconsistent.

To this end, the Audit Division incorrectly states

that the issue in the Chicago Bridge & Iron case was whether a
use tax constituted an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce.

The question of the constitutionality of state use

taxes had already been resolved prior to the Chicago Bridge &
Iron case.

See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309

U.S. 33 (1940); see also Chicago Bridge & Iron, 119 P.2d at 949952, and cases cited therein.

The issue of whether the

California use tax met constitutional muster was, therefore,
ancillary to the primary issue in the case.

Indeed, the first

sentence of the Chicago Bridge and Iron case states plainly:
The controversy presented by this appeal involves the
liability of [CBI] for the payment of use tax levied
under the California Use Tax Act of 1935.
119 P.2d at 946.
The California Supreme Court further stated:

gt\vpc\082\00000173p.w51
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It cannot be doubted that those
purchased by [CBI] to fabricate
fulfill contracts or orders for
were purchased for use, storage
[California].
Id. at 948.

materials that were
tanks specifically to
tanks in California,
or other consumption in

Based on the exact facts at issue in the present

case, the California Supreme Court held that CBI was liable for
California use tax on all "materials . . . purchased for use in
California . . . .H Xd. at 949.
The Audit Division also cites Article V of the
Multistate Tax Compact (the "Compact") as authority for its
position that sales and use tax must be paid to Utah, rather than
California.

When viewed in light of the facts in this case, the

Compact does not support this proposition.
Article V of the Compact (codified at Utah Code Ann.
S 59-22-1 (1953), currently Utah Code Ann. S 59-1-801 (1987))
states:
Each purchaser liable for the use tax on tangible
personal property shall be entitled to full credit for
the combined amount or amounts of legally imposed sales
or use taxes paid by him with respect to the same
property to another state and any subdivision thereof,
(emphasis added.)
The overriding condition for allowing a credit under the Compact
is, of course, that the sales or use tax must be legally imposed
by the other state.
The California Supreme Court has ruled that CBI is
liable for California use tax on purchases of steel plate and

gt\vpc\082\00000173p.v51
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other raw materials that become component parts of property used
in California, and CBI has already self-assessed and paid use tax
to California on the purchases of raw materials for such
products.

The taxes payable on these purchases are not legally

payable to Utah.
Utah's imposition of a sales or use tax on purchases of
steel plate and other raw materials that are specifically made to
fulfill orders for tanks and other manufactured products to be
delivered in California and to be assembled in California,
exceeds the constitutional restrictions imposed on Utah's power
to levy sales and use taxes.

The foundational case on this issue

is Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).

In

Complete Auto, the United States Supreme Court set forth a four
part test for analyzing taxes that purportedly violate the
Commerce Clause.

In order to sustain a tax, a state must show

that "[1] the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial
nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly
related to the services provided by the State."

.Id., at 279. The

tax in question fails the first and fourth parts of the Complete
Auto test.
As applied to sales and use taxes, the Complete Auto
analysis views a sales or use tax as a one-time "property tax"
imposed on the future use of the property in the taxing state.
g:\wpc\082\00000173p.w51
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There is no question that CBI should pay a property tax to Utah
on the ownership of the real and personal property that comprised
the Salt Lake facility.

Utah clearly had sufficient nexus with

and provided the kinds of police and other state protections to
the property and equipment at the Salt Lake facility that justify
compensation to Utah by CBI.

During the period in question, CBI

paid real and personal property taxes on the Salt Lake facility.
However, Utah had insufficient nexus with the tanks
that were manufactured at the Salt Lake facility for CBI
customers in California and that were shipped to and assembled in
California, and Utah provided no state services incident to the
use of such tanks in California.

California, on the other hand,

did, and California continues to provide such state protections
incident to the use of such tanks.
Utah has already been compensated for its state
protection of the manufacturing facility through CBI's payment of
real and personal property taxes. Utah should not also be paid
the "transaction property tax" on the personal property
manufactured at the Salt Lake facility where Utah has no nexus
with and provides no ongoing protection to such manufactured
property, and where another state, such as California, does
provide such protection.

The imposition of a sales or use tax on

the purchases at issue in this case fails the test set forth in
Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
g*\wpc\082\00000173p.w51
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Finally, the Audit Division completely misconstrues the
purpose of the enactment of Utah Code Ann. S 59-12-104(33).

That

section was not enacted to give some special benefit to real
property contractors.

The section simply recognizes that the

federal Commerce Clause limitations analyzed in Complete Auto
prohibit Utah from taxing such extraterritorial activities.
D.

CBI DID NOT INTENTIONALLY DISREGARD LAW

The Audit Division asserts that because CBI disagreed
with the position of the Audit Division on liability for sales or
use tax, CBI intentionally disregarded law.

Apparently, the

Audit Division believes that any announced position of the Audit
Division constitutes established law, notwithstanding contrary
statutory or case authority.

The Audit Division is wrong.

The Audit Division cites a February 29, 1984 letter
from Donald R. Bosch, Director of the Auditing Division (Record
at pages 98-99), as the sole authority for its assertion that CBI
intentionally disregarded the law.

However, the Audit Division

admits that the letter merely *outlin[ed] its position."
(Respondent's brief at page 22.)

(emphasis added.)

The February

29, 1984 letter amounted to nothing more than a restatement of
the Audit Division's position—it did not constitute established
statutory law or case law.
Although apparently there is no state law on point, for
federal income tax purposes, it is well established that the
gi\wpc\082\00000173p.w51
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positions of administrative agencies and their employees do not
have the force of law.

Even a published determination of the

Internal Revenue Service (such as a private letter ruling or a
and revenue ruling) does not constitute established law or rule.
To this end, the Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") provides:
"Unless the Secretary otherwise establishes by
regulations, a written determination may not be cited
or used as precedent."
I.R.C. § 6110.

See also Stubbs, Overbeck & Associates, Inc. v.

United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1146 (5th Cir. 1971) ("A [revenue
ruling] is merely the opinion of a lawyer in the agency and must
be accepted as such. . . . As such, it has no more binding or
legal force than the opinion of any other lawyer.").

See also

Foil v. Commissioner, 920 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1990); CWT Farms,
Inc. and CWT International, Inc. v. Commissioner, 755 F.2d 790
(11th Cir. 1985); Schneier v. Commissioner, 735 F.2d 375 (9th
Cir. 1984).
Because the Audit Division's letter constituted nothing
more than the position of the Audit Division, CBI had every right
to disagree with the Audit Division's position, particularly in
light of the fact that Utah statutory and case law did not
support the Audit Division's position, and California statutory
and case law were directly contrary to the Audit Division's
position.

gt\wpc\082\00000173p.v51
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The Audit Division admits that the very issues at stake
in this case had previously been resolved in CBI's favor.
(Transcript at page 70.)

Further, contrary to the assertion of

the Audit Division, at no time prior to or after the Audit
Division's letter of February 29, 1984 did CBI ever agree to pay
sales or use taxes to Utah in the future as a condition of
resolving in CBI's favor past alleged deficiencies.

(Transcript

at page 74.)
As the Audit Division itself admits, the February 29,
1984 letter "evidences a long standing disagreement between the
Auditing Division and Petitioner regarding Utah sales tax."
(Transcript at page 24.) The letter evidences a disagreement—
and nothing more.

That disagreement existed after the letter,

and still exists.
The Audit Division introduced no evidence at the
hearing that CBI intentionally disregarded any established law.
Indeed, the only evidence of established law introduced at the
hearing was introduced by CBI.

In Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v.

Johnson, the California Supreme Court ordered CBI to pay use tax
to California on the very kind of purchases at issue in this
case.

Had CBI ignored the order of the California Supreme Court

it would, indeed, have been guilty of "intentional disregard of
law or rule."

gi\vpc\082\00000173p.v51
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CBI to pay use taxes to California, as a matter of law, CBI
cannot be found to have intentionally disregarded law or rule.
The Audit Division also completely ignores the
authority cited by CBI that illustrates that CBI is not even
liable for simple negligence, much less "intentional disregard of
law."

The cases cited at pages 18 through 20 of CBI's Brief of

Appellant demonstrate the standard for simple negligence adopted
by both federal and state courts.

Contrary to the Audit

Division's assertion that the cases construing Section 6651(a)
are not applicable in the instant case because Section 6651(a)
deals with a taxpayer's failure to file, the "reasonable cause"
standard set forth in Section 6651(a) is indeed the standard used
by both federal and state courts in determining whether a
taxpayer was negligent in not paying taxes which arguably were
due, as well as determining whether a taxpayer was negligent in
failing to file a return.

See cases at CBI's Brief of Appellant,

pages 18-20. Those cases illustrate that CBI was not negligent.
Under Utah law, the Tax Commission cannot access
penalties unless the taxpayer was at least negligent.
Ann. § 59-1-401(3) (Supp. 1991).

Utah Code

See also Robert H. Hinckley v.

Utah State Tax Comm'n, 404 P.2d 662, 669 (Utah 1965).

Where CBI

cannot be liable for ordinary "negligence", and thus liable for a
10% penalty under Utah Code Ann. S 59-1-401(3)(a), as a matter of
law, it cannot be liable for "intentional disregard of law or
g*\vpc\082\00000173p.v51
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rule", and thus liable for a 15% penalty under Utah Code Ann.
S 59-l-401(3)(b).
The Audit Division presented no evidence that CBI
intentionally disregarded any established law or rule.

There is

no evidence that CBI was negligent or intentionally disregarded
any established law or rule. As a result, there are no facts
that would support the imposition of penalties against CBI.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, CBI respectfully requests
that the ruling of the Utah State Tax Commission be reversed and
that CBI be given the following relief:
1.

The imposition of sales or use tax by the Utah

State Tax Commission with respect to the purchase of steel plate
and other raw materials that were manufactured into tanks,
pressure vessels, and other structures that were then shipped and
assembled outside the State of Utah should be reversed.
2.

The case should be remanded to the Utah State Tax

Commission with instructions to refund the taxes, penalties, and
interest previously paid by CBI.
3.

If sales or use tax is determined to be payable on

such purchases, the penalties imposed by the Utah State Tax
Commission on any sales or use tax deficiencies should be
reversed, and the case should be remanded to the Utah State Tax

gi\vpc\082\00000173p.w51
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Commission with instructions to refund such penalties, together
with the interest on such penalties, previously paid by CBI.
DATED this /3

day of December, 1991.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

By:
Robert A. Peters*
Ronald G. Moffitt
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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copies of the within and foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be
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day of December, 1991, to the

following:
Lee Dever, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent-Appellee
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